

Post-Jungian and post-Kleinian perspectives on Transference

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INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that the Kleinian and Winnicottian traditions have creatively stimulated and inspired psychoanalysts who work with children, and this is certainly true of Jungians, especially Michael Fordham and his Analytic School in London.

By concentrating on the question of transference and its technical use in the analysis of children and adolescents, I shall first of all explore some aspects of the technique not only in order to highlight theoretical differences, but also to point out areas of cross-fertilisation based on post-Jungian and post-Kleinian approaches. These reflections will be neither complete nor objective, but will take into account my subjective position as it has developed since my Jungian and Kleinian training, and over thirty years of working experience. The second part of the chapter will describe some influences of the Winnicottian approach, in which a general theoretical part will be followed by some specific thoughts concerning transference in relation to children and adolescents.

EVOLUTION OF SOME KLEINIAN MODELS IN RELATION TO JUNG'S THINKING.

As pointed out by Segal [34] it is assumed that most of the basic characteristics of the Kleinian technique derive directly from Freud. Bott Spillius [9] summarised these very clearly: "...rigorous maintenance of the psychoanalytic setting so as to keep the transference as pure and uncontaminated as possible; an expectation of sessions five times a week; emphasis on the transference as the central focus of analyst-patient interaction; a belief that the transference situation is active from the very beginning of the analysis; an attitude of active receptivity rather than passivity and silence; interpretation of anxiety and defence together rather than either on its own; emphasis on interpretation, especially the transference interpretation, as the agent of therapeutic change." [9, p. 5]

Twenty years later, the idea of a "pure and uncontaminated" transference seems to be a somewhat paradoxical way of considering manifold unconscious phenomena rooted in complex layers of an analysand's mind that can usually be traced back to the beginning of life. Furthermore, the current view of it having to do with the creation of new psychic agencies conflicts with the idea of *uncontaminated*: every birth is unavoidably a contamination. Such *purity* implies that so-called

“external” reality (including whatsoever pressures and demands) plays a secondary role in the interactions and so any elements regarding an analysand’s present reality or incidents of the historical past should be considered manifestations of the relationships and forces at work inside his or her internal world. This approach leads to conceiving *every* (verbal or other) communication of the analysand as a *symptom-symbol* aimed at simultaneously *hiding and showing* a conglomerate of unconscious fantasies, the anxieties related to them, and the defences against them. The entire internal universe of object relations is constantly and actively in the foreground at every moment, and no “neutral” acts or communications are conceivable in principle.

The pervasiveness of unconscious fantasy is a core concept of Klein’s approach to mental life, and underlies the idea of the “purity” of the substantially ubiquitous transference. Technically, this becomes a *belief that the transference situation is active from the very beginning of analysis* and, mainly, leads to a technical *emphasis on interpretation (especially of the transference) as the agent of therapeutic change* – but I shall return to technical issues later.

The idea that unconscious fantasy (as a prerequisite of the transference) forms the bedrock of the mind is definitely crucial, and at least partially defines what a *mind* is, which brings me to one of the many theoretical points in Jung’s speculations.

In “Psychology and Alchemy” [20], Jung distinguished various levels and functions of imagination, essentially stating that true (or *truly transformative*) imagination – which he calls a *dialogue with the Other’s voice* and compares to the process experienced by ancient alchemists in the concreteness of transmuting metals – relates to the human capacity of simultaneously *turning matter into mind and mind into matter*. This is the *subtle body*.

This is a very interesting point. No fact is a living fact until we take it in terms of its fantasised quality; *raw* facts are less than nothing, unusable raw material. Similarly, no fantasy is alive until it is placed in some kind of body, and accompanied and sustained by the concreteness of a relationship, smells and voices, emotions and fears; *raw* fantasy is less than nothing, unusable raw material.

I have always understood the pervasiveness of unconscious fantasy in Klein’s terms as being close to Jung’s definition of imagination, and appreciate that Jung in some way more explicitly puts the question in terms of a *mutual* interaction between matter and fantasy.

Bion’s idea of a *contact barrier* leads us into similarly interesting and stimulating territory [3]. He defined it as an *active, porous and filtering* barrier that simultaneously keeps the conscious and unconscious contents of the mind, as well as internal and external elements, in sufficiently flowing contact and sufficiently separated, and relates it to our ability to *dream reality* when we are awake, without being overwhelmed by reality as such (which would make it meaningless) or by

unconscious fantasies. It is a way of remaining sufficiently asleep when we are awake and continue to dream what we are actually experiencing, while simultaneously protecting us from a virtually psychotic condition.

The idea of a contact barrier, which I see as a very creative expansion of Klein's concept of the ubiquity of unconscious fantasy, and once again very close to Jung's notion of imagination, is clinically very relevant. Independently of specific technical tools and the specific attitudes of analysts in conducting their work, these concepts regard the fundamental capacity of staying in that sort of *third space* – between raw matter and abstract thinking – which is peculiarly psychoanalytic.

I would agree with Klein's giving unconscious fantasy such a central role because, if we see transference as directly deriving from ubiquitous unconscious fantasies (including the anxieties and defences related to them), we cannot but agree with her notion of transference as a total situation.

In her 1952 paper, "The Origins of Transference" [24], she wrote "It is my experience that in unravelling the details of the transference it is essential to think in terms of *total situation* transferred from the past into the present, as well as emotions, defences, and object relations" and, commenting on this conceptualisation, Joseph says: "By definition it must include everything that the patient brings into the relationship" [19]. However, this *everything* deserves further clarification. In expanding Klein's calling the transference *total*, Joseph adds in an essential element. Concerning how and what to understand of the analysand's communications in a broad sense, she says: "What he brings in can be gauged by our focusing our attention on what is going on within the relationship, how he is using the analyst, alongside and beyond what he is saying. Much of our understanding of the transference comes through our understanding of how our patients act on us to feel things for many varied reasons; how they try to draw us into their defensive system; how they unconsciously act out with us in the transference, trying to get us to act out with them; how they convey aspects of their inner world built up from infancy – elaborated in childhood and adulthood, experiences often beyond the use of words, which we can often only capture through the feelings aroused in us, through our counter-transference, used in the broad sense of the word" [19, p. 62].

Twenty years after Bion's elaboration of the communicative use of projective identification, this represents a remarkable evolution in the traditional Kleinian approach. *Using the analyst* as a whole becomes essential. The complexity of the transference, which goes far beyond the simplistic repetition and re-projection of relatively recognisable unconscious contents, makes detecting the analytic encounter increasingly subtle, and its traits more uncertain and polymorphous. Transference is located in a realm that goes beyond patent representations, essentially including non-representable contents and *relational elements*.

In Joseph's speculation, counter-transference becomes the main means of understanding what goes on within an analytic session. In some respects, her position is much closer to an "epistemology of the contagion" (certainly more familiar to Jungians) but, as I will say later, this relates to *one-way* functioning.

This quite substantial epistemological change within the Kleinian world is of course clearly influenced by Bion's *Copernican Revolution* concerning the use of projective identification and the analyst's *reverie*, even though it comes not many years after Klein's quite different attitude to counter-transference.

In this respect, Bott Spillius [9] offers another interesting vignette: "According to Segal, Klein frequently used the concept of projective identification in her own work, but phrased her interpretations about it as statements about the patient's wishes, perceptions and defences. If, for example, a patient reported a dream in which a screaming baby had the face of the analyst, Klein would have said 'You can't tolerate your own infantile feeling of screaming, so that you wish to get rid of those feelings into me and therefore see me in your dream as a screaming baby'. If an analyst reported to her in supervision that he had actually felt like screaming, Klein's view would have been that the analyst needed a little self-analysis." [9, p. 9]

Klein's view definitely tends to objectify an analysand's mind, with particular stress being placed on the supposedly *intolerable feelings* one may only wish to get rid of. No matter *why* these feelings should be experienced as intolerable, there is no trace of any expectation that the Object may do something to make these feelings more meaningful, and therefore tolerable. The Object would just understand, through a precisely objective description, that the Subject needs to get rid of something. No importance is given to the fact that we may assume the fact that the screaming baby in the dream has the analyst's face is meaningful. And if the analyst himself felt like screaming, this would have meant that he needed further analysis.

I dare say that probably most Kleinians (and possibly some Jungians) would interpret the same dream – reinforced by the analyst's feeling of wanting to scream – as the analysand's need to make the analyst know exactly how he feels as a small child and, therefore, to be helped to *face* such a difficult emotional state exactly as he would be helped by a mother. In other words, the dream would be taken as a way of *dealing with* screaming *via* the Object, and not *getting rid* of it by means of an evacuative projection into the Object. This is exactly the opposite of what Klein is supposed to have done, and it is not difficult to imagine its impact on the analysand's sense of being properly *understood and not left alone*.

However, things are not so difficult in this particular case because we have the fully representational content provided by the analysand's dream and the corresponding feeling aroused

in the analyst, and so the question is not one of how to understand the *meaning of what* is going on, but *why* the intensity of the communication is such as to require a double track: a clear representation *and* intense projective identification. It might be speculated that a baby like this may have experienced an *emotionally deaf* mother (which would be sufficient reason in itself for finding one's feelings intolerable), and thus had to raise his voice and use every possible means to be heard and seen. However, and in any case, we should ask ourselves why the analysand is using us in such a peculiar way.

Things would be different if the representational part were totally missing. If we had no dream but only the analyst's experience of feeling like screaming, the situation would be more difficult to detect, and more liable to arbitrary interpretation. While counter-transference is certainly a decisive means of understanding what is going on, the risk of *over-subjectivity* (or frankly delusional products) on the part of the analyst must not be overlooked. In this respect, maintaining some elements of Klein's attitude towards the objectivity of what an analysand actually says and does can be a healthy counterpoint to the excessively subjective use of counter-transference.

Spillius also tells the well-known story of a young analyst who told Klein he felt confused about something that occurred in a session, and therefore interpreted to his analysand that it was the analysand who had projected confusion into him; to which Klein replied, "No, dear, *you* are confused" [35]

Leaving aside the impact that that "dear" must have had on the poor supervisee, Klein was probably at least partially right: analysts are frequently more confused than is acceptable, regardless of their analysands' projections. However, the limitation of Klein's attitude is that it considers the analyst's confusion a *mere* disturbance (the opposite of his expected clarity in understanding and interpreting the objective state of mind of the analysand), as if the question for the analyst were the opposition between confusion and his capacity to be acutely objective.

When Bott Spillius [9] describes how Kleinian analysts of that generation – essentially the generation of *Melanie Klein Today* – probably worked, he says that "...nearly all Kleinian analysts, however, now use the concept of counter-transference in a wider sense, that is, as a state of mind induced in the analyst as a result of verbal and non-verbal action by the patient, thus giving effect to the patient's phantasy of projective identification" [9, p. 11].

However, if we consider expressions such as "a state of mind *induced*" or "*action by the patient*" or – Joseph's position – "how the *patient uses* the analyst", we can understand that the stress is put on the analysand's more or less subtle (or more or less evident) activity *on* the analyst as a receiver. Although the responses of the receiver are now considered substantially more important (no longer disturbances, but essential tools in the process of comprehension), and although these responses

expand the same conception of transference (as Joseph puts it), they are nevertheless conceived as *responses*. In this *one-way* perspective, the transference is supposed to be *total* (as it surely is given the ubiquity of unconscious fantasy) but the analyst has the burdens of *counter-responses* or *counter-transference* that are supposed to be properly (i.e. interpretatively) used. But is this absolutely or exclusively so? What is the meaning and role of the analyst's subjectivity? And how does it express itself?

We can take it for granted that analysts should refrain from imposing their own trivial views or projecting their own emotional life into their analysands. Reassurance is certainly counter-productive as it inevitably becomes a short-circuit response that leaves the real anxiety unattended (and therefore unconsciously enhanced), and greatly reduces the analysand's trust. Gratification may be no less dangerous insofar as it can lead to subtle ways of keeping unmanageable fantasies denied.

I always feel quite suspicious of certain easy and unethical translations of Jungian *epistemology of the contagion* or some *let's-share-our-feelings* attitudes or trivial *self-disclosures* that are supposedly theoretically justified by what I see as placatory and mystifying interpretations of Jung's *Psychology of the Transference* [21]

The analytic relationship is, and needs to be *natural*, *un-usual*, and certainly *non-symmetrical*: natural insofar as it is based on the prototypical mother-infant relationship, which is *maternal and paternal* in principle; natural insofar as it is supposed to divert a supposedly unchangeable destiny, which is a peculiar human prerogative; non-symmetrical as mothers and fathers are supposed to be similar-in-their-complexities to their babies, but not identical to them; and un-usual because analysis should provide an emotional experience that – in order to be productive against millions of opposing factors – must be something that the analysand cannot find anywhere else.

THE RHYTHM OF PRESENCE AND ABSENCE

What Jung describes in “The Psychology of the Transference” [21] helps us to move away from the concept of analysis as the territory of an analysand's *one-way* projective world in which the analyst uses *counter-responses* as a metabolising Object, and towards a multi-determined relationship in which the analyst enters as a whole and complex Subject. The subjectivity of the analyst is a crucial factor in making *symbolic action* possible by boosting slight traces of proto-meaning.

My understanding of the quaternity (the symmetrical structure of the Holy Marriage as described by Jung in “The Psychology of the Transference”, and which I like to consider as the metaphor of a dance) brings me to the rhythmic features of the primal – and not only primal relationships – in

which the experience of *presence* and *absence* and their interplay are essential elements on the paths of the *emergent mind*, and therefore beyond the principle of linear causality.

The question of the presence and absence of the object in relation to the development of a capacity for symbolisation is of paramount importance and has been widely discussed in the literature. The *baby* we have in mind is able to desire (basically to desire *life*) and, in principle, this implies an ability to represent (or at least experience in a proto-representational way) the absence of what is desired. This ability is by no means genetically ready-made, but learned and internalised before quite precociously becoming part of the implicit schemas of functioning, and it grows out of the *emotional quality* with which the absence of the object is actually experienced.

It is well known that absence may turn into catastrophe (Bion's *beta state*), but it can also become tolerable and thinkable – symbolised – if the *absent* object can be experienced as *present* in what I like to call the baby's *emotional orbit* [5]. This is made possible by the presence of a mother who is capable of not simply *mentally metabolising*, but also being well-disposed (as a *subject-object*) to the encounter and *actively* prepared to give her child a core sense of existence. It is definitely a matter of rhythm.

Primal introjection is naturally fragile and needs endless confirmation. In particular, it requires a certain *quality* of the object. *Mother* is not simply a transformative object, but an object with a particular subjective orientation towards relationships and the unfolding of life. If the Self calls for the object, it calls for its entire subjectivity, and mainly its wish to give life *joyfully* to the Self. In this respect, every object relation is essentially inter-subjective. A well-internalised object has to be regarded as a *well-internalised subject*, a mindful and life-wishing object. This is how we give foundation to our own minds, by discovering – as we can naturally expect – that the *mind of the other* exists, and helps and wishes life. This expectation (preconception in Bion's terms) is what can be called *archetypal* [25], the notion of which – in this light - is completely unsaturated as it has no representational content.

Anne Alvarez extends Bion's theory of thinking, and sustains that thought is not only generated by absence but also by the modulation of presence, which is a prerequisite for the acquisition of the flexible and articulated (non-catastrophic) modifiability of the object. The caregiver offers a constantly changing presence, full of dynamic flows and *temporal shapes*. [2] "Modulation and regulation of presence is a task for the infant... which is probably prior to maintaining object constancy throughout absence" [2, pp. 193-194]. This is what I refer to when I speak of absence experienced *within* the presence, the absent object being experienced within the baby's *emotional orbit* in which the object is present.

Moving from Alvarez's ideas concerning the dynamic qualities of the object, Maiello [31] offers further reflections on the notion of temporal shapes intertwined with her speculation concerning the Sound Object [30] by suggesting that these temporal shapes and their rhythmic qualities "...belong to these deep levels of proto-mental interpersonal experience and have a bridging function in the transition from state of non mental psycho-physical at-oneness on the way to mental activity and symbolic thinking" [31, p. 180]

As seen in the manifold manifestations of mother-infant interactions, shared attunement [Stern], and the timing and prosody of music and poetry between babies and mothers [Trevarthen *et al.*], rhythm can be seen as the element structuring temporal shapes and internalising basic trust.

THE RHYTHM OF THE UNSATURATED ARCHETYPE

Rhythm is also implied in the model of the mind conceived by Michael Fordham. In what can be read as a "structural model", Fordham described the Primal Self as an integrated, steady-state somatic-psychic unity that rhythmically undergoes the movements of deintegration and reintegration. These movements concern the opening of the archetypal components of the Self to encounter the object and, subsequently, re-establish a state of relative equilibrium and tranquillity in which experiences are assimilated on a cognitive and emotional level.

The structural hypothesis of an *a priori* and *integrated* Self is questionable in the sense of conceiving it as "*the Archetype of Archetypes*" or in the sense of a saturated representation of "*a steady-state Self*", which seems to be too similar to old conceptions assuming a sort of *primary un-objectual state*.

The limitations of Fordham's deintegration-reintegration model lie in its being rooted in a structural theory that postulates an integrated Primal Self, which – inadequately in my opinion – is seen as a structure that contains all archetypal potentials and at the same time activates the deintegrative sequences. The integrated Primal Self is an axiom that goes against much evidence of a neonate's early un-integrated state of the neonate.

The concept of deintegration regards the dawn of new potentialities within the relational milieu of individuals, in which the object sustaining the process is crucially important. Fordham states that deintegration and reintegration describe a fluctuating state of learning in which the infant opens itself to new experiences and then withdraws in order to reintegrate and consolidate those experiences. During a deintegrative activity, the infant maintains continuity with the main body of the self (or its centre), while venturing into the external world to accumulate experience in motor action and sensory stimulation [16].

Let us assume that this sense of continuity or “centre” is the outcome of introjection rather than an *a priori* structure: in this light, new perspectives may be opened by moving from the structural and oversaturated view of Fordham’s model in the direction of a more essentially dynamic conception. This is particularly true if we think of the fundamental rhythm of intra-psychic and relational psychic life, including the transference situation [7].

We should *desaturate* the Primal Self, possibly by making it closer to a certain view of Kernberg, who says that it is *the sense of Self* (with all of its introjective determinants) that becomes a *structure* or *the Self as agent*, and that *there is no pre-ordinate structure from which the sense of Self emerges*. If we consider Fordham’s model dynamically, no matter what the “starting point” of the sequences he describes may be (an integrated or un-integrated primal state), we can better highlight its interactive, interpersonal and rhythmic nature.

Fordham’s model can also certainly be substantially enriched if – beyond the structural model – the definition of Archetype itself is revisited in terms of what I have previously called an unsaturated Archetype.

FORDHAM, TRANSFERENCE AND COUNTER-TRANSFERENCE: AN ETHICAL ISSUE

One fundamental distinction regards the question of syntonic *versus* illusionary transference/counter-transference, which Fordham started to reflect upon after the Second World War by considering Kleinian speculations on the projective and introjective mechanisms related to projective identification, by means of which the subject feels that he is, or has become, an aspect of the other’s mind.

Syntonic transference/counter-transference describes a quality of the relation in which the analyst’s responses follow a proper and productive deintegration activated by the analysand’s deintegrates. The entire complexity of projective and introjective movements, together with defences and deintegrates, creates a meaning in the analyst that can be defined empathetic pre-consciousness.

Illusionary transference/counter-transference describes a disturbed contact in which the analyst’s responses are activated by means of introjective identification with the analysand’s defences and/or the re-activation of infantile positions in the analyst. The recognition and working through of such inevitable fractures in communication may lead to cognitive improvements and emotional transformations.

Fordham radically criticised Jung’s distinction of reductive and prospective analysis by stating that it is reductive analysis that favours the process of individuation, whereas the prospective method risks increasing rather than resolving illusionary transference. Reductive analysis better develops syntonic transferences/counter-transferences and helps in working through those that are illusionary. This

method implies decoding complex structures and reducing them to their simpler component parts. Fordham says that it is a *reduction from the complex to the simple that does not imply the reduction of the Subject to its infantile state, but clarifies what pertains to who, or what belongs to what part of the internal structure of the analysand.*

Identification and dis-identification lie at the heart of this method, which is exquisitely *individuating* because the construction of subjectivity is founded upon the interplay of identifications and dis-identifications, together with projective and introjective vicissitudes. In this sense, it is an essentially ethical approach because the belonging of specific components of the individual universe to an internal *Who* determines and increases the sense of subjective responsibility and care. I would also like to mention briefly (it goes beyond the scope of this chapter) Fordham's important concept of *Defences of the Self* [15] beyond its relevance for understanding autism. In this frame of reference, defences are seen as lame tools for coping with the *danger-safety* spectrum that the Self continuously experiences in response to the object's attitude, once again involving the position of the object as external or internalised.

In addition, if we want to expand Jung's concepts of transference beyond the category of causality, we also need to refer to more recent Jungian speculations concerning the *emergent mind* that are related to neuroscientific research studies [Cambray and Carter], [Wilkinson]. By exploring the phenomenology of psychic facts beyond the epistemological limitations of the principle of causality, the notion of the emergent mind has much in common with Bion's *selected fact*, and this has profound implications in defining *development* as a whole and in conceptualising and clinically using interpretation and the role of the analyst's *subjectivity*.

THE EMERGENT MIND

Emergence is a concept drawn from the complexity theory of dynamic systems, and refers to the interactions of agents that produce results operating at a higher level of organisation than that of the agents themselves, and beyond what can be explained by studying the individuals involved. This self-organisation does not require a pre-formed template and does not depend on the direction of a supra-ordinate entity, but arises spontaneously out of the interactions of the component parts.

In this frame of reference, the mind is seen as being *supervenient*, emerging from the underlying neural processes taking place in the body, with properties that are more than those that could be obtained by means of reduction, but less than those obtainable from full separation or duality. Emergent processes generally operate optimally at the edge of order and chaos, and are seen as the locus for the coming into being of life and the mind.

In order to position ourselves outside a rigid deterministic perspective (which is so clinically relevant) and place our analytic work beyond the concept of *development*, we have to consider the principle of self-organising emergent qualities, and the ongoing creation of new (unexpected) meanings and psychic agencies. As may be obvious to people who do not like to be called gnostics, *self-organising* does not mean that everything happens magically in some spontaneous, mystic or automatic manner and, above all, it does not mean it works without interlocution and care *of* and *by* the object.

Emergence seems to operate on the subtle edge of *chaos* and *order*, where chaos is not a shapeless and confused state of randomness, but an undetectable complexity. The mind is being continuously born out of a complexity whose boundaries and characteristics are always beyond our limited knowledge, and involve neither simplistic nor random causalities. Chaos can be depicted as complex and evasive, not at all *pure* and *untouched*. Chaos implies that humans are difficult and undetectable beings, with millions of traces silently and loudly working as one – or one against the other. Order – in the first instance – is a mother's wish for her baby's life, with sufficient trust and joy. Emergence is relational in essence and definitely highly sensitive to, and dependent on, the slightest qualities of both conscious and unconscious interpersonal exchanges.

If, as I have done elsewhere [5] [6], I have to describe chaos *in the face of*, or *together with*, or *within a shared abyssal distance from* an autistic analysand (in whom meaninglessness is carried to an extreme), I would probably say that we sail under black-out conditions and without sound, smell, rhythm or certainly *symbol*, but nevertheless invaded by bits of images, lights and sounds, smells, movements, fractures and encounters, limping closeness and eternal moments of absence – with a certain amount of trust that some sense may eventually grow out of it.

We certainly do not look for *solutions* because Jung himself has warned us that the most important problems in life (as in all *self-regulating systems*) are essentially insoluble, but look for a reasonable *emerging synchronic advance*: an acceptable degree of advancement is not mistaking *chaos* with our *death*, and not mistaking senseless repetition with our subtle *death of faith*, our subtle *burnout* syndrome.

If our healthy megalomaniac position with certain analysands fades away for too long, we should start getting seriously worried, and it would be better to refer our analysand to a younger colleague, someone who has not yet been killed by reasonableness and whose muscles are still strong enough to use.

Is it a matter of faith? To what extent? Faith in Bion's *O*? In the unreachable *thing-in-itself*? In its generative potential?

Faith in the poetic nature of the unconscious, as Jung would have called it? Faith in the subtle border between Chaos and Order, where the *emergent* synchronically springs out?

Or faith in children? In their mothers and fathers, when occasionally they *subvert* a destiny that previously looked so dark?

Beyond any mysticism, I would define myself a man of faith, the faith that sets *knowledge and transference* in a mutually untamed relationship of truth that is capable of producing unexpected effects.

From various perspectives, many authors have stressed the critical importance of internalising *real* experiences with caregivers. Real experiences (but it is not that easy to define what *real* really means psychoanalytically) very soon become part of implicit memory, and are turned into internal schemas that give shape to the apprehension of further experiences until the *Self's* needs and *the world of otherness* provide an opportunity to modify them. Such a relational interplay requires ongoing adaptation to the continuously changing needs of Self *and* object, and increasingly complex negotiation and reciprocal adaptation seem to be the essential ingredients of psychological organisation.

This is the relational *milieu* that makes possible the *emergent self-organising processes* through which humans cope with inevitable partial maladjustments in their early (and later) encounters.

In this view, unconscious fantasies themselves (and the transference deriving from them) are the ubiquitous *emergent* outcome of the metonymic and (later) metaphoric work operated by the internalised interplay of subject and object. In terms of their representational content, unconscious fantasies cannot be considered genetically determined, but the result of repeated internalisations of *clusters of preconceptions-realizations* that progressively take on increasingly articulated shapes. They are *always dual* and *very early* in origin, and their precursors can be seen in very primal relationships and soon become a part of implicit memory.

Although we can and must trust innate expectations (pre-conceptions) of healing encounters, we realise that even the most elementary *mentalizations* are the emergent outcome of real internalised interactions. This is particularly important when dealing with profoundly damaged analysands (adults or children) because of the relevance of the object's role in stimulating emergent processes. An analyst's subjectivity is crucial in determining the specific quality and personal "style" of being a "reclaiming object", in which the complexity of the analyst's personal vicissitudes interact with the innate dispositions that should always be supposed as potentially existing and operating, even in the most "locked up" cases. As analysands so frequently suffer from *basic wounds* to their sense of being legitimated to life, they need to be (and presumably *expect* to be) *delicately violated*. The subjectivity of the object has to be gently imposed to them, with the sweetest violence possible, and

a continuously selective aliveness and relatedness. The analyst's *personal equation* comes into play in various ways, and the analyst's *neutrality* has to be seen as a way of interacting in what I like to call *relational solitudes in development* (an oxymoron that describes the paradoxical nature of human interactions): two (lonely) subjectivities in mutual growth.

We can consider the Jungian concept of *amplification* in this light. Originally conceived as a method opposed to Freudian *free association* in the interpretation of dreams, amplification essentially implied the use of *metaphorical circularities* as a means of progressing from oneiric images to the complex symbolisms of the collective unconscious, and was essentially operated by the analyst's mind.

I see amplification as a preconscious widening (in the analyst's mind) of the verbal and non-verbal derivatives provided by the analysand, in a process that uses the whole of the analyst's complex subjectivity, including his personal determinants and individual cultural patrimony in a broad sense. Amplification is a cure *within the word* activated by the complex and multi-determined subjectivity of the analyst, a *broadening* of what tends to become narrow and lifeless.

If we have *pre-representational traces of a disposition towards the encounter* (as we may define the Archetype) that the *word* turns into meaning and sense, we can say that *free amplifications* nourish the emergent mind. In this light, interpretations themselves are the foundation of new identifications and not simply a means of revealing causes and antecedents.

Interpretation deals with *reparation* and the selected fact regards *discovery*, an instrument by means of which the subject constantly ensures his ability to proceed: both have in common the fact that they are *alpha* [4].

Bion's *preconception-realisation* model itself strongly involves the subject not only as a bearer of pre-representative *raw* elements (beta), but mainly as the one who lives in *expectation* of encountering the object (and I would add: expectation of *that specific* encounter): that nipple for that mouth, that milk for that hunger, that mind for that catastrophe, that smile for that darkness, that sense for that cold, that hand for that fall, and so on through thinking and doing. Jungians might say *Archetype* when talking of expectations, but I would add *Archetype ad personam* just to reaffirm that *each* child waits to be continuously and specifically brought to life by the *mother* and *father* he has always *known* to exist.

I totally agree with Proner who, in his paper "Contemporary Transference Work", says that "there is an important distinction between 'analysing the transference' and 'working in the transference' [...]. The former is a method in which, along with placing emphasis on a number of different areas as part of the analytic process, transference is spotted and perhaps interpreted or referred to, or perhaps just made a mental note of. Working in the transference, by contrast, refers to the use of the transference

as the central orientation in the analytic method, a practice that is predicated upon the belief that virtually all the material brought to the analytic session, whether verbal or non-verbal, whether dreams or free associations, communicates something about the on-going inner relationship between the patient and the analyst” [14, p. 389].

However, this needs to be integrated and amplified by recognising the role of the analyst’s complex subjectivity, which is what I see as the most precious heritage of Jung’s model as expressed in his *Psychology of the Transference*.

The quaternary relationship between the two unequal components of the analytic couple allow the potential for an emergent advance as the *third unexpected* element. In this respect, analysis has to do with the *culture of the unsaturated*, which is also close to Winnicott’s notion of transitional space: a neither internal nor external place in which the transference develops as a new creation of the analyst and analysand – a place in which they *create* and *find* each other. The unsaturated and the unexpected can by no means be considered *total* because *the idea of totality limits the horizon*. In this sense, although the transference may be legitimately called total, the analytic situation as a whole may not.

TRANSFERENCE IN CHILDREN

When we encounter and deal with transference in children, we are confronted with what Laplanche [27] called *the ordinary* and *the extraordinary* to a greater extent than when working with adults, and this brings us to the infinite capacity of the mind to express and symbolise internal reality through its *metaphorical* capacity. This is strictly related to the movement of the transference, given that the two terms have a common root in the Greek word *meta-pherein*. which means “to bring beyond”.

Didier Houzel [18] argues that the Freudian discovery of the transference arises from the human capacity to find – or be found by - the unexpected starting from small clues. Particularly when working with children, we have to put ourselves in this position and support our young analysands in symbolically (re)constructing the lost object, and becoming sufficiently capable of withstanding the experience of absence and loss to make it representable. Transference phenomena originate against a background of non-catastrophic absence – modulated by its rhythmic presence – which becomes intertwined with our *empty* disposition to welcome and be surprised by the unexpected.

Klein placed transference at the core of her conception of an *internal psychic space* which *naturally and immediately* unfolds provided that the analytic setting is sufficiently safe and stable. Winnicott recommended patiently waiting for its *natural development*, which is brought about by the growing trust of the analysand in the technique and the analytic situation. Jung himself repeatedly used his

alchemical metaphors, such as that of the *vessel*, to underline the need to protect the analytic situation in such a way as to allow its proper development.

In a certain sense, these are general rules, but working with children makes them particularly relevant because the analytic situation becomes *plastic* [14] and enriched with variables that are not present (or are definitely less important) when working with adults. An interesting article by the Italian Winnicottian child analyst, Mariassunta Di Renzo, “Il transfert nella Psicoanalisi con i bambini” [13], argues that four elements are relevant in this respect, which I would like to cite and partly reformulate:

First of all, in child analysis, we meet two peculiar aspects of the transference that bring us up against the unexpected: to various extents, the child’s transference always includes undigested elements of the parents’ mental world evacuated into the child, and the transference of the parents to the analyst is always important because it influences the child’s transference and the analysts’ emotional responses.

Secondly, child and analyst are always *vis-à-vis* involved with their physical presence and multi-sensorial activity. Smells, sounds, body movements and glances powerfully accompany every emotional transaction and every meta-elaboration. This *fatigue of paradox* is related to the fact that the analyst is constantly engaged in two ways: as the Other (via the transference) and as the Real (via the senses). Anyone who has the strength and patience to read Jung’s *Mysterium Coniunctionis* (which is at times as difficult as dealing with a quite disturbed child analysand) will find it easy to relate certain metaphors, such as “Blackness” or “Sulphur”, to his everyday analytic practice with children; furthermore, some unexpected development may make other metaphors such as “Whiteness” or “Lapis” equally clear [22].

Thirdly, the role of playing with analysands who are already able to play is clearly relevant not simply in the sense of the child’s *personifications* [23] but also in the sense of the intermediate space between internal and external, me and non-me, dream and action [32] [39].

Fourthly, the transference is not limited to the person of the analyst, but regards the whole context. What is transferred is the *internal* environment in which the child lives, which becomes mixed with *that provided by the analyst* as a *total* reformulation of the relationship the Self had with its original environment.

A child analyst plays the fundamentally *dual* role of a *real-and-new* object and a *transference* object. Following Winnicott, insofar as a child is allowed to *use* the analyst by *creating* the level of transference he can bear from moment by moment, the analyst becomes a *real-and-new* object experienced as something different from the child’s original objects. This is also close to Loewald’s [29] description of transference interpretation as a means of opening up a new level of relationship

with the analyst as a new object, which in turn makes it possible to develop new ways of being and relating.

A child analyst is *live company*, a *reclaiming object* [1] a *transformative object* [8] by means of which a child is enabled to experience new and non-recognised aspects of the Self. Given the global engagement of the analyst within the sessions, this requires a careful distinction between *acting out* and *action*. Once again, the entire subjectivity of the analyst, which includes an imaginative attitude founded on the ability to listen and use *negative capability*, is particularly relevant: but equally important are the cultural background and responses he can infinitely give to his own never-ending infancy and recreation of life, because these are the prerequisites for allowing the child to encounter a new object and establish new identifications.

The term “counter-transference” is restrictive in describing the complexity of the analyst’s position, which does not simply include emotional reactions and fantasies, nor describe general open-mindedness or broad responsiveness, but it also includes a capacity to welcome a state of *not-knowing* what the child thinks and feels – or tolerating what the child is *not* able to think and feel – and also not knowing who we *unconsciously represent* for the child moment by moment. Psychic agencies are in a continuous state of transmutation.

TRANSFERENCE IN ADOLESCENTS. *I AM AN-OTHER*

Given the general principles described above, the specificity of transference in adolescence leads us to consider how transference phenomena (in a broad sense that includes the analytic situation as a whole) intermingle with developmental processes in adolescence. On the other hand, different theoretical conceptualisations about adolescence affect the way the transference is conceived and dealt with.

The kind of peculiar polymorphism that unites transference and adolescence can be referred to Cahn’s position [10] when he underlines the need to consider the psychoanalytic care of adolescents as starting from a simultaneously synchronic (structural) and diachronic (evolutionary) perspective. In this respect, adolescence is the essential place of the mutation of transference shapes. Ladame [26] draws an intriguing parallel between transference and adolescence when he states that both put the Subject face to face with Otherness, by re-enacting early relationships: *I am an-Other*.

However, the literature regarding transference and adolescence is extremely wide and, as already said, reflects different theoretical approaches and ways of conceiving adolescent development. To quote briefly some well-known positions, we can refer to the Laufers’ notion of *breakdown transference* [28], which is connected to their stress on the integration of the sexualised body; *transference disharmoniosys* [10], which is connected to the obstacles to the proper growth of

subjectivity as a result of narcissistic primal failures and a weak *me/non-me* differentiation that prevents the formation of a creative space in the sense of Winnicott; or the *mentalisation breakdown* described by Fonagy when he reflects on cognitive and symbolic deterioration and its effects on transference.

These differences not only reflect diverse theoretical approaches, but certainly also the intrinsic complexity of adolescence by focusing on specific issues that may also be referred to respectively as puberty, mid-adolescence and late adolescence.

I cannot but agree with the Italian psychoanalyst, Bachisio Carau in “Forme cliniche del transfert in adolescenza” [12] that, beyond their theoretical and technical differences, it is remarkable to note that almost all analysts working with adolescents underline the importance of the *narcissistic configurations* of the transference in adolescence. Puberty subverts the previous narcissistic equilibrium based on the protection given by the parental figures of the age of latency, and this subversion makes the entire functioning of the psyche unstable and precarious as the adolescent challenges parental authority (in terms of internal agencies) and the Ideal linked to it. This process is related to the well-known search for vicarious external objects that support narcissistic needs and boost essential transformative potentials, and such a reshaping of psychic space involves a certain degree of regression-reorganisation that requires the remodelling of early narcissistic positions. This combination of factors may make the whole process devastating or, on the contrary, unexpectedly creative. An entire universe is set in motion: the Oedipal and the pre-Oedipal, the Super-Ego and the Ego Ideal, the narcissistic and the objectual. Chaos is at stake, and the possibility of the Emergent is by no means guaranteed. It is a *fight for consistency* in a situation in which everything is constantly at risk of collapsing.

Beyond any specific psychopathological features, adolescent transference is basically interwoven with this fight for consistency and the sense of the risk of collapse – both of which are simultaneously feared and sought.

An analyst can easily become the enemy when dependency is felt as dangerously suffocating, but may also become a prime ally insofar as he is seen as supporting the most risky task of life, felt to be truly *interested* in the adolescent’s chaos, and understood as prepared to accept being *so close* to death.

An analyst must show endurance, silence, respect and sensitivity, be capable of waiting, and be prepared to include death and disruption as possible outcomes of existence. Nobody confronts us with the possibility that life can fail more than adolescents.

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